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During  September  1947,  Anglo-American  economic  diplomacy  met 
with  a  crisis,  hard  on  the  heels  of  that  which  had  attended  the 
suspension  of  sterling  convertibility  the  previous  month.  The 
multilateral  trade  talks  taking  place  in  Geneva,  which  were  aimed 
both at the eventual creation of an International Trade Organization 
(ITO),  and  at  securing  substantial  reductions  in  barriers  to  world 
trade,  had run into major problems.  Accordingly,  Ernest  Bevin,  the 
British Foreign Secretary, and Sir Stafford Cripps, the President of the 
Board of Trade, met with William L. Clayton, US Under-Secretary of 
State for Economic Affairs, and Lewis W. Douglas, the US ambassador 
to London. Clayton emphasised strongly that, unless the British made 
substantial steps towards the elimination of her imperial preference 
trading system, ‘the Americans would look upon it as a repudiation of 
one  of  the  important  conditions’  of  the  1945  US  loan  to  Britain. 
Douglas  stepped  in  to  say  that,  unless  she  amended  her  attitude, 
Great Britain might well get left out of any help given to Europe under 
the recently-announced Marshall Plan.2 In the British view, this was 
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‘blackmail’.3 In reality, it was ‘conditionality’, for the Americans were 
not demanding money with menaces,  but were attaching strings to 
their  own offer  of  financial  help.  Yet,  even though the UK did not 
agree  to  dismantle  the  imperial  preference  system,  the  Americans 
failed  to  carry  out  their  threats.  The following month,  Britain,  the 
USA, and thirteen other countries signed the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This supposedly interim agreement, which 
was meant to provide a framework for tariff reductions in advance of 
the creation of the ITO, in fact continued as the basis on which world 
trade  was  regulated,  until  it  was  superseded  by  the  World  Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 1995. 
Attlee’s  ministers,  therefore,  had done three  things  which,  at  first 
sight, might seem rather surprising. First, although Britain was in a 
state  of  profound  economic  weakness,  and  dependent  on  future 
American assistance, they had refused to cave in to a direct threat 
that such assistance would be withheld. Second, in so doing, although 
they had a powerful (if  not unchallengeable)  claim to be genuinely 
anti-imperialist,  they  had  successfully  defended  the  imperial 
preference system.4 Third, although they professed themselves to be 
socialists,  to  whom  free  trade  might  have  been  expected  to  be 
anathema,  they  had  signed  an  international  agreement  the  aim of 
which, broadly speaking, was to move towards freer trade. What was 
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the  significance  of  these  (in  some  ways  rather  contradictory) 
achievements, and by what processes did they come about?
In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to examine in detail 
the 1947 Geneva negotiations and the attendant decisions taken by 
ministers.  British historians of  the Attlee government,  have not,  to 
date, done this. This is, perhaps, a less surprising omission in general 
accounts of the period than it is in specialised accounts of the Labour 
government’s economic policy, and, indeed, in accounts of its external 
economic policy  in  particular.5 American writers,  by  contrast,  have 
shown rather more interest  in the origins of  the GATT.  Richard N. 
Gardner’s  Sterling-Dollar  Diplomacy,  first published  in  1956,  still 
provides, in spite of its occasionally polemical tone, a seminal aid to 
understanding the issues at stake. However, Gardner’s comparatively 
short account of the Geneva talks themselves was mainly reliant, in its 
assessment British politicians’ intentions, on public pronouncements 
made  by  them at  the  time.6 Thomas  W.  Zeiler’s  more  recent  Free 
Trade Free World (1999) is based on an extremely impressive amount 
of  archival  research.  But  not  only  is  his  account  of  the  American 
motivation for signing the GATT in some ways unsatisfactory,7 he also 
fails to provide a sure guide to British policy.8 
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There is room, therefore, for an account of the Attlee’s government’s 
role in the Geneva talks that is fuller and more systematic than those 
previously attempted. That role must be understood in the light of the 
difficulties  Britain  experienced  in  negotiating  for  the  reduction  of 
trade  barriers  in  the  face  of  countervailing pressures.  On the  one 
hand, the increasing weakness of Britain’s external economic position 
during 1947 meant that it was dangerous, at least in the short term, 
to liberalise trade substantially, as this would encourage an influx of 
imports which would have to be paid for with dollars, which were in 
very  short  supply.  On  the  other  hand,  to  refuse  to  do  so  would 
jeopardise the prospect not only of direct American aid, but also that 
of  the  US  trade  concessions  which  were  vitally  necessary  for  the 
future  health  of  Britain’s  export  trade.  In  addition,  the  Attlee 
government’s  genuine,  if  progressively  eroding,  belief  that  an ITO-
type multilateral world trading regime would help avert a recurrence 
of  the  economic  errors  of  the  interwar  years  was  matched  by  a 
simultaneous desire to undertake socialist planning at the domestic 
level. Yet as some contemporaries recognised, multilateralism abroad 
was inconsistent with a high level of planning at home, because freer 
trade implied letting market forces determine, to a degree at least, 
the size of particular industries.9
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In spite of these practical and ideological problems, the outcome of 
the negotiations represented a success for Britain, which, to a striking 
degree, withstood pressure to fall in with American views on trade. In 
explaining this outcome – which was surprising given the immense 
power  wielded by the United States  at  this  time -  this  article  will 
adopt  the  following  structure.  First,  the  wartime  and  postwar 
background to the Geneva talks will be outlined. Then, the course of 
the  negotiations  themselves  will  be  described,  in  relation  to  other 
major developments such as the launch of the Marshall Plan and the 
advent  and demise of  sterling convertibility.  Finally,  an assessment 
will  be  made,  not  only  of  why  Britain  was  finally  able  to  reach 
agreement with the United States,  but of why the process took so 
long, and came so close to breakdown. It will be suggested that the 
episode yields important lessons about the methods by which Britain, 
in her weakened postwar condition, resisted, to a significant degree 
successfully,  US  attempts  at  hegemonic  imposition.  There  are  also 
lessons  to  be  drawn  about  the  limits  to  American  power  in  this 
period.10 The results of the Geneva talks illustrate how even the most 
powerful nations may be confounded in key aims by countries they 
might be expected to be able to dominate, if their own objectives are 
conflicting and if the policy tools they use in the search for hegemony 
are flawed. 
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The wartime discussions that preceded the birth of the GATT led to 
seminal  shift  in  US  trade  policy,  from  a  bilateral  approach,  to  a 
multilateral  one.11 US planning  for  the post-war  world  had started 
within the State Department as early as 1939, and was predicated at 
first on the assumption that future progress towards freer trade would 
be  based  on  a  straightforward  extension  of  the  reciprocal  trade 
agreements  programme  initiated  in  1934  by  Secretary  of  State 
Cordell  Hull.  Joint  Anglo-American  planning  came later,  stimulated 
first  by  the  signature  of  the  Atlantic  Charter  in  August  1941,  and 
given a further boost by the collapse of US isolationist sentiment after 
Pearl Harbor. Then, on 23 February 1942, Britain committed herself to 
Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement, whereby as ‘consideration’ 
for American Lend-Lease aid,  there would be ‘provision for agreed 
action by the United States and the United Kingdom ... directed ... to 
the  elimination  of  all  forms  of  discriminatory  treatment  in 
international commerce, and the reduction of tariffs and other trade 
barriers.’12 There  followed  a  drawn-out  process  of  Anglo-American 
negotiation as to the form this consideration should take.
One key official British initiative was John Maynard Keynes’s plan for 
an international clearing union, published in April 1943 at the same 
time as Harry Dexter White’s  parallel  US plan for an international 
stabilization  fund  and  reconstruction  bank.  Another  was  the 
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complementary  plan  designed  by  James  Meade  (a  Labour-
sympathising  Keynesian  economist  and  war-time  official)  for  an 
international  commercial  union,  designed  to  create  a  multilateral 
trading  system,  from which,  Meade  believed,  Britain  was  likely  to 
benefit.  However  –  and  here  were  the  anticipated  indispensable 
British  conditions  for  participation  –  both  state  trading  and  ‘the 
continuation of a moderate degree of Imperial Preference’ would be 
permitted.13 These proposals formed the framework of the Anglo-US 
Article VII discussions which took in Washington during the autumn of 
1943.  As James N. Miller  has noted,  by the time these discussions 
began, the British and Americans had, for differing reasons, reached 
the same conclusion: the world needed a system of multilateralism in 
trade  that  involved  multilateral  clearing,  a  multilateral  negotiating 
mechanism for the reduction of tariffs, and multilateral inclusion in 
the design and operation of the system’s rules and exceptions.14 This, 
they believed, would be facilitated by the creation of an international 
trade organisation.
Labour ministers in Churchill’s coalition government were, with the 
notable  exception  of  Ernest  Bevin,  amongst  the  strongest  British 
supporters of this agenda. This was in spite of the fact that the Labour 
Party’s programme had, since the early 1930s, been based upon the 
creation  of  a  planned  economy  in  Britain.15 The  potential  conflict 
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between the party’s aspirations did not go completely unrecognised. 
For example, the 1943 Washington proposals – emerging out of the 
Article  VII  talks  –  were  warmly  welcomed  by  Sir  Stafford  Cripps. 
Cripps  was  at  this  time  an  independent  MP  and  the  Minister  for 
Aircraft Production; later, as Attlee’s first President of the Board of 
Trade (1945-7), he would play a crucial role in the GATT talks. In spite 
of the broad support he leant to the proposals, he also emphasised 
that  ‘I  should  find it  very  difficult  to  agree to  bartering away our 
freedom in internal policy unless it were for a politically realistic and 
practical method of regulating international trade and finance.’16
This question – to what degree should Britain accept restrictions on 
her  own  freedoms  as  the  price  of  achieving  a  more  satisfactory 
international  economic  environment  –  provided  a  dilemma  for  the 
Attlee government during the postwar trade negotiations. (It was, of 
course,  a  dilemma  that  was  by  no  means  unique  to  Britain.)  The 
problem was exacerbated by the fact that, in spite of their common 
commitment  to  the  restoration  of  multilateral  trade  via  an 
institutionally multilateral forum, the Americans and the British had 
substantially different ideas of what a ‘realistic and practical’ method 
of regulating international trade would be. A key difference in attitude 
was  summed  up  by  James  Meade  in  July  1945:  ‘there  is  a  very 
dangerous trend of thought in the USA, of which Will Clayton in the 
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State Department may be taken as the symbol, that the way to cure 
unemployment is to have stable exchange rates and free trade rather 
than (what is much nearer the truth) that the only way to achieve the 
conditions in  which one can establish  freer  trade and more stable 
exchange rates is for countries to adopt suitable domestic policies for 
maintaining employment.’17 
The war also had the effect of accentuating US anti-imperialism, and 
hence American opposition to the imperial preference system, whilst 
at the same time strengthening British attachment to the system as a 
means  of  reinforcing  commonwealth  ties.18 The  Labour  Party 
increasingly supported the preference system out of gratitude for the 
help  afforded Britain  by  the Dominions  during the war.19 This  was 
almost regardless of the views of the Dominions themselves on the 
subject: Canada proved an enthusiastic and committed supporter of 
the  American  multilateral  trade  project,20 and  although  the  other 
commonwealth countries were more circumspect, the USA in the end 
came to view them as more tractable on the preference issue than 
Britain  herself.  A  further  potential  problem was  that  although  the 
1945 renewal of the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act renewal 
marked a legislative high-point in the US trade liberalization program 
- the president’s authority was extended to allow him to reduce tariffs 
by up to 50% of the rates standing on 1 January 1945 – Americans 
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tariffs would remain high in comparison to British ones, even if this 
authority were to be employed to the maximum possible extent.21 This 
limited the extent of the concessions the British would be prepared to 
make  in  return  during  post-war  negotiations;  and,  indeed,  their 
determination  only  to  yield  tariff  and  preference  reductions  in 
exchange for adequate compensation eventually paid off.
When the war ended, the issue of trade took on a new importance for 
the British. The US cut-off of lend-lease in the aftermath of VJ day put 
it close to the top of the newly-elected Labour government’s agenda. 
Britain  was  on  the  verge  of  bankruptcy,  and  required  substantial 
American  financial  aid.  The  Americans  were  determined  to  couple 
discussion of such help with the elimination of restrictions on postwar 
trade.22 The  first  formal,  post-war  negotiations  to  establish  an 
international commercial policy regime commenced in Washington on 
1 October 1945. (The financial talks, which in due course resulted in a 
$3.75 billion American loan to Britain, had started on 11 September). 
During these talks, the British succeeded in getting US agreement for 
their point of view on the questions of cartels and state trading. But 
the question of preferences proved much more difficult. The American 
negotiators  found  the  imperial  preference  system,  which  was 
inherently  discriminatory,  highly objectionable.23 As  Lionel  Robbins, 
one of the British team, noted in his diary, it would take a great deal 
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to shift  the top US officials  ‘from their  conviction that  an outright 
surrender of  Imperial  Preference is  the price necessary  to get  the 
financial arrangements through Congress. As this is the one way in 
which  we  could  not undertake  to  get  rid  of  prefernces,  there  is 
obvious  trouble  ahead’  (emphasis  in  original).24 The  British  were 
insistent that, given Britain’s economic weakness and the state of her 
domestic opinion, they could neither afford to eliminate preferences 
outright, nor could they be seen to do so in exchange for American 
financial aid, but could only trade them away in exchange for major 
reductions in US tariffs.25 Somewhat paradoxically, then, the weaker 
party to the negotiations was able to use the very fact of her own 
economic infirmity as a means of justifying her failure to fit in with 
important aspects of the stronger party’s designs.
This  was  –  and  would  continue  to  be  -  a  successful  tactic.  The 
Proposals for Consideration by an International Conference on Trade 
and  Employment which  emerged  from  the  talks  (and  which  were 
issued  in  December  1945  at  the  same  time  as  the  Anglo-US  loan 
agreement) appeared to reflect a victory for the British point of view:
In the light of the principles set forth in Article VII of the mutual 
aid agreements, members [of the proposed ITO] should enter 
into arrangements for the substantial reduction of tariffs and for 
the elimination of tariff preferences, action for the elimination of 
preferences being taken in conjunction with adequate measures 
for the substantial reduction of barriers to world trade, as part 
of the mutually advantageous arrangements contemplated in 
this document.26
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This  was  far  cry  from  the  language  of  the  original  American 
proposal.27 The changed draft made clear, as Secretary of State James 
Byrnes  noted,  that  ‘we  are  not  asking  the  British  to  give  us  a 
unilateral commitment on preferences in consideration for financial 
aid and apart from what may be done on tariffs and trade barriers 
generally’.28 Nevertheless,  the ‘mutually advantageous’  formula was 
to  some  degree  ambiguous.  Cripps  therefore  suggested  that  both 
sides  should  agree  an  explanation,  supporting  the  British 
interpretation, to be made by the UK government in parliament.29 In 
due course, such a statement was made in the House of Commons by 
Prime Minister Clement Attlee on 6 December: 
We for our part are ready  to agree that the existing system of 
preferences within the British Commonwealth and the Empire 
will be contracted provided there is adequate compensation in 
the  form  of  improvement  in  trading  conditions  between 
Commonwealth and Empire countries and the rest of the world 
...  reduction  or  elimination  of  preferences  can  only  be 
considered in relation to and in return for reductions of tariffs 
and other barriers to world trade in general.
...all  margins  of  preference  will  be  regarded  as  open  to 
negotiation, and it will of course be for the party negotiating the 
modification of any margin of preference which it is bound by an 
existing  commitment  to  give  to  a  third  party,  to  obtain  the 
consent of the third party concerned.30
But when the proposed wording of this statement was presented to 
the  Americans,  they  took  ‘violent  exception’  to  this  idea  that 
modification of the imperial preference system would be dependent 
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on  the  consent  of  the  Commonwealth  countries  concerned.31 The 
British argued that, due the contractual nature of the original Ottawa 
agreements, which had established the system in 1932, in order for a 
given preference to be abolished by the country that granted it, the 
country that benefitted from it would have to agree. Therefore, the UK 
could not pledge unilaterally to abolish preferences, but could only 
promise to negotiate in good faith for their abolition.32
It appears, however, that the British did not stand firm on this point. 
Although  Attlee  did  go  ahead  and  make  his  statement,  the  US 
representatives also drew up a statement which the British agreed the 
Americans  could  make  if  the  necessity  arose.  As  Clayton  later 
recalled, ‘That statement provided that if the Dominions were to adopt 
an  unreasonable  position regarding the elimination  of  preferences, 
the  United  Kingdom  would  denounce  their  agreements  with  the 
Dominions.’33 Of  course,  what  consituted  ‘unreasonable’  behaviour 
was  something  that  was  potentially  open  to  widely  differing 
interpretation – and, arguably, it was unreasonable of the two powers 
to make a secret arrangement of this nature. In fact, the Americans 
never  did  come  to  perceive  Dominion  behaviour  as  sufficiently 
unreasonable as to merit the proposed action by the British. But, in 
spite of the original British attempts to ensure clarity, this UK-US pact 
muddied the waters. Partly as a consequence of this, there remained a 
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serious disparity between the two sides’ views on how far the UK was 
obliged to go in the direction of the elimination of preferences. This 
would become evident during the 1947 Geneva talks. (It also became 
clear  that  there  were  some  differences  between  the  Americans 
themselves on this point.) The British believed that they were fulfilling 
their  obligations  merely  by  negotiating  –  and  that  they  were  not 
committed  in  advance  to  a  wholesale  elimination  of  preferences  - 
whereas  the  Americans  believed  that  substantial  preference 
eliminations were required in order to meet the terms of the 1945 
agreement. The ambiguity of that agreement therefore helped sustain 
the  Attlee  government  in  its  stand  against  the  US  position.  US 
attempts  to  impose  ‘conditionality’,  then,  were  hampered  by  the 
imprecision of the original conditions.
It must, however, be stressed that, in spite of these Anglo-American 
differences,  the  British  government,  in  the  months  prior  to  the 
opening  of  the  Geneva  conference  in  April  1947,  did  remain 
committed to the broad principles underlying the proposed ITO. It was 
by no means the case that they had accepted trade multilateralism 
simply  as  the  price  of  getting  the  loan.  Cripps  had  stressed  in 
September 1945 that  ‘provided that  our position is  safeguarded in 
certain important respects, a multilateral commercial convention, if 
one can be obtained,  may  be very  much in  our  interest.  The vital 
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objective of a 50 per cent expansion of our exports is not likely to be 
reached in a world in which the markets of other countries are hedged 
about  by arbitrary and unregulated barriers  to trade’  (emphasis  in 
original).34 Believing that the Anglo-US commercial policy proposals 
included the necessary safeguards, he became the ‘main advocate of 
the ITO policy’ in the British government. (This did not prevent him 
simultaneously advocating measures of government bulk purchase, of 
a  kind  that  were  anathema  to  the  Americans.)35 He  emphasised 
privately just before the Geneva talks opened that ‘the Government 
are  whole-heartedly  behind  this  attempt  to  rectify  the  economic 
troubles of the world’.36
Cripps’s  convictions,  however,  were  by  no  means  fully  shared  by 
British opinion more generally. Gardner has argued that in the run-up 
to  the  conference  there  was  a  hardening  of  views  in  favour  of 
retaining imperial preference. He attributes this to three factors: 1) 
the election in 1946 of a Republican Congress, which was likely to 
oppose the reduction of US tariffs, 2) President Truman’s acceptance 
of  the  Republican  proposal  that  future  trade  agreements  should 
include an ‘escape  clause’,  and 3)  the conclusion of  the 1946 US-
Philippine  trade  agreement,  which  instituted  a  preferential  tariff 
arrangement,  albeit  one  which  was  designed  to  be  progressively 
eliminated over a long period.37 Thus, although the Attlee government, 
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and  Cripps  in  particular,  continued  to  hope  that  the  forthcoming 
conference would be a success – in spite of the fact that they did not 
anticipate the complete elimination of the preference system – they 
began to plan for other eventualities. In January 1947, the cabinet 
agreed to the establishment of a group of outside economists, which 
would study the alternative polices which might be adopted in the 
event of a complete or partial breakdown of plans for an ITO.38 This 
was to be kept top secret. As it turned out, the group, which met from 
March to October, was unable to devise any satisfactory alternative to 
participation  in  a  multilateral  world  trading  system,  and  had little 
impact on policy.39 
The Geneva talks themselves had been preceeded by a preparatory 
conference in London in October 1946, which had drawn up a draft 
charter for the proposed ITO. The Geneva talks, formally speaking, 
were the second session of this preparatory committee, in advance of 
a United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment (which was to 
take place in Havana between November 1947 and March 1948). They 
were not only  aimed at  further refining the draft  charter,  but also 
involved the first multilateral bargaining process, whereby the fifteen 
countries  present  swapped  concessions  on  tariffs  and  preferences. 
The  concessions  made  in  agreements  between  pairs  of  countries 
would then be generalised to the other countries involved in the talks 
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on a  most-favoured-nation basis,  thus  giving the negotiations  their 
‘mutually  advantageous’  character.  These  concessions  would  be 
incorporated  into  a  general  agreement  (the  GATT),  which  also 
included an interim set of commercial policy principles which, it was 
intended, would in due course be superseded by the ITO charter.
The  success  of  the  talks  would  be  dependent  on  the  agreement 
between America and Britain, the world’s two most powerful trading 
nations,  and  to  a  significant  degree,  on  the  personal  relationship 
between  their  respective  negotiators-in-chief,  Will  Clayton  and 
Stafford Cripps. Clayton was the spiritual heir to Cordell Hull in the 
State Department, and believed in freer trade to a degree that Cripps 
and  other  British  representatives  came  to  see  as  fanatical  and 
unrealistic.40 There were also other key negotiators to whom there will 
be further cause to refer. On the British side, Harold Wilson was, after 
Cripps  (to  whom  he  was  subordinate),  the  minister  most  heavily 
involved. He was Secretary for Overseas Trade, and was promoted to 
the position of President of the Board of Trade towards the very end 
of  the  talks.  At  the  official  level,  James  Helmore  was  the  most 
significant figure. He was Second Secretary at the Board of Trade, 
and,  unlike  Cripps  and  Wilson,  was  almost  continually  present  in 
Geneva  throughout  the  negotiations.  For  the  American  State 
Department, Clair Wilcox, director of the Office of International Trade 
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Policy, and Winthrop G. Brown, chief of the commercial policy division 
were,  after  Clayton,  the  most  important  individuals.  The  varying 
personal  talents  and  dispositions  of  the  negotiators  might  have 
mattered  little  had  it  been  true  that,  as  is  sometimes  stated,  the 
United States was in a powerful enough position simply to impose the 
trade policy of its own choosing.41 But this proved not to be the case.
 
Cripps’s speech to the opening session of the conference decried the 
1930s tendency towards autarchy and self-sufficiency: ‘our national 
prosperity  depends  upon  a  world  policy  of  trade  expansion  to  be 
based upon an extensive international division of labour’.42 Yet, at a 
subsequent  press  conference,  although  he  emphasised  Britain’s 
commitment to the ITO, when ‘Asked if an offer by United States of 
America of the maximum 50% reduction in her tariff on all requests 
would be regarded as adequate compensation for the “dismantling” of 
Imperial Preference, the President replied “No”.’43 
(This was because, even if reduced by 50%, US tariffs would remain 
high by British standards.) Cripps’s comment – widely picked up on in 
the American press  -  implied that  one of  the Americans’  key  aims 
would be unattainable.
The  US government,  did  not,  however,  make  a  great  issue  of  this 
remark.44 The comparatively  emollient  US stance can be explained 
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partly by the appreciation that not all imperial preferences were of 
major  economic  significance,  and  therefore  to  insist  on  complete 
elimination of  the system might  be  unnecessary.  All  the  same,  the 
talks ran into difficulties early on. The Americans had decided to make 
their  full  offers  of  tariff  reductions  right  away  and  thus  make  a 
generous impression.45 But this tactic did not have the desired effect 
of bringing forth generous tariff offers from the other countries. In 
particular,  the  results  of  the  negotiations  with  the  British 
Commonwealth  were  disappointing.46 The  alleged  paucity  of  the 
British offers in particular would be the recurring American theme 
throughout the Geneva talks.47
Crucially,  moreover,  Clayton thought not only that the British were 
being profoundly ungenerous,  but  that,  in failing to make what  he 
regarded  as  decent  offers,  they  were  in  breach  of  the  1945  loan 
agreement. Others in the US delegation were not so sure, pointing out 
that the British had pledged not to abolish preferences, but merely to 
negotiate in good faith for their abolition. And the British ability to do 
this  successfully  was  potentially  compromised  by  the  refusal  of 
Australia,  at  the  beginning  of  the  Geneva  talks,  to  waive  its 
contractual  rights  under the Ottawa agreements.48 Clayton thought 
that  the  British  were  merely  using  this  as  an  excuse,  and that,  if 
necessary, the British should unilaterally abrogate their commitments 
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to Commonwealth nations in order to live up to her commitments to 
America  under  the loan agreement.49 But  if  Clayton’s  analysis  was 
right, it would mean that the UK would be bargaining away Australian 
preferences in the UK market, at no loss to the UK, in exchange for a 
reduction in US duties on British products entering America. Quite 
reasonably, some US officials insisted that this would be unfair.50 
Nevertheless, there was some truth in Clayton’s allegation that the 
British  were  not  playing  ball.  They  were  not  making  all  possible 
efforts to secure waivers from Commonwealth countries; rather the 
reverse. In July, Cripps warned the cabinet that Canada’s desire to be 
released from her own obligations to Britain represented a dangerous 
breaking of ranks: ‘it sets a precedent to break away from agreements 
on  preferences  between  Commonwealth  countries,  which  ...  might 
lead to a gradual disintegration of the system.’51 These were not the 
words  of  a  man  negotiating  in  good  faith  for  the  abolition  of 
preferences  and  frustrated  only  by  the  recalcitrance  of  other 
countries. 
However,  the  Americans  were  themselves  open  to  accusations  of 
double-standards. A bill relating to the wool tariff had recently been 
introduced in Congress, and if this bill became law, it would almost 
certainly lead to an increase in the wool tariff.52 This in turn explained 
21
Australia’s reluctance to liberate Britain to satisfy the Americans by 
absolving  her  from  her  commitments  on  preferences.  Congress’s 
action was not of course the fault of the Truman administration, which 
was  seriously  embarassed.53 On  May  18,  Clayton  returned  to 
Washington to try and prevent the passage of the wool bill, which, he 
believed, was putting the whole ITO project at risk.54 The bill passed 
anyway, but on 26 June Truman exercised his veto. But although the 
worst-case  scenario  had  been  averted,  Clayton  still  lacked  the 
authority to offer a cut in the wool tariff – and he would not get it until 
early August. This meant that the Geneva tariff talks would for the 
time being remain stalemated.
By this time, it had become clear that the British and the Americans 
viewed the negotiations very differently. During May, James Helmore 
had suggested that the US insistence on obtaining, in return for its 
own concessions, equivalent concessions from other countries, would 
not bring about a world in which there would be a minimum of trade 
restrictions.  If  the  Americans  really  wanted  to  reach  a  liberal 
international  trade  regime,  he  suggested,  they  needed  to  make 
unequal bargains that would hurt some US industries. An equal Anglo-
American bargain on tariffs and preferences would only prolong the 
period during which Britain  would  be  forced to  take  advantage  of 
balance-of-payments  exemptions  to  quantitative  restrictions  rules 
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under the ITO charter.55 When Helmore wrote to Clayton along these 
lines, the latter rejected the ‘fundamental inequity’ of this approach. 
But Helmore received ministerial support: Harold Wilson backed him 
up,  and it  seems likely  that  Cripps  supported  his  general  position 
too.56
Moreover, Cripps himself now began to play down in public the overall 
significance of the Geneva talks. In a speech in Dundee on 11 June, he 
noted the fundamental economic imbalance between the USA and the 
rest of the world, whereby America continued to export $500 million 
of goods each month more than she bought. This situation, he said, 
could only be remedied if ‘some very special and exceptional steps’ 
were taken to deal with it. He argued that the creation of an ITO and 
the reduction of tariffs and preferences would not alone be enough to 
solve the problem, and he was undoubtedly right.57
Cripps’s  talk  of  ‘very  special  and  exceptional  steps’  was  almost 
certainly  a  reference to  the the recently-announced Marshall  Plan. 
Secretary  of  State  George  Marshall’s  famous  Harvard  speech  was 
delivered on 5 June, and radically changed the landscape in which the 
ITO  negotiations  took  place.  Welcome  though  it  was,  the  British 
remained deeply anxious about their economic situation. On 23 June 
Cripps  briefed  the  editor  of  the  Times that  Britain’s  dollars  were 
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running  out  fast  and  might  be  gone  by  November.  Moreover,  he 
thought that Clayton was too wedded to the ITO, ‘but perhaps [was] 
less obsessed by “non-discrimination”’ than he had been previously.58 
Indeed, during this period the Americans maintained a public facade 
of  strict  adherence  to  the  non-discrimination  clause  of  the  loan 
agreement, but were accomodating in private.59 
Although the British found the Americans supportive in this regard, 
the UK attitude to the Geneva talks was causing the US concern. In 
late June, Clayton complained to Cripps that both in relation to tariff 
matters and to the Charter discussions the British delegation had not 
given the USA the measure of support to which they were entitled. 
Cripps ‘was at some pains to make it clear to Clayton how erroneous 
this view was ...  there was no question of our support for the ITO 
Conference being half-hearted’. Clayton suggested that Cripps should 
make his attitude obvious to the world by returning to Geneva to take 
a further part in the proceedings. Cripps indicated his willingness to 
comply.60 The US delegation hoped to use Cripps’s visit to Geneva to 
‘put the screws on the British’.61 They believed that, by the time he 
arrived, they would have received authority to offer a cut in the wool 
tariff.  A  new offer  to  Australia  would  remove  Britain’s  excuse  for 
inaction on preferences.  Breaking the stalemate  with the Southern 
Dominions would help bring pressure to bear on the UK: ‘Situation 
24
would also enable us simultaneously to strike hard on all other fronts 
where negotiations are now lagging.’62 
Cripps  had  his  own  reasons  for  accepting  the  invitation.  A  brief 
provided to him on 10 July – a few days before sterling was made 
convertible under the terms of the loan agreement - argued that the 
non-discrimination  provisions  of  the  draft  ITO  charter  would  bear 
particularly heavily on Britain as compared to other countries when it 
came to gaining exemption on balance of payments grounds. This was 
because, it was argued, alone of any country that was likely to have 
recourse to the exemption procedure, Britain had accepted the full 
convertibility obligation of the IMF and therefore needed to get the 
approval of both the Fund and the ITO before acting to protect her 
balance of payments. Moreover, the brief suggested, this also meant 
that British efforts to maintain the convertibility of the pound would 
have to contend against a widespread freedom for other nations to 
discriminate against Britain. ‘In order to break the present deadlock 
in which the Americans refuse to give their  mind to this very real 
problem an approach at the highest level is required.’63 Geneva was 
not  merely  a  convenient  location  for  Cripps  to  make  such  an 
approach. If the British were to ask to be let off the hook, it was best 
to do it whilst simultaneously and visibly affirming a commitment to 
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the ITO as a whole, and a high-level ministerial visit to the talks was 
an ideal way to achieve this.
Cripps arrived in Geneva on 11 July. The American plan to ‘put the 
screws on’ was confounded, however, as authority to offer the wool 
tariff  cut  had  not  yet  been  received.64 Cripps’s  first  meeting  with 
Clayton  accordingly  caused  the  Americans  deep  frustration  and 
pessimism.65 The Americans made a presentation comparing the US 
and UK offers, pointing out that the US had requested the elimination 
of preference on about 65 items, but the UK had offered elimination 
on only three minor items,  namely chilled or frozen salmon, motor 
bicycles and motor tricycles. Cripps hit back, arguing that the British 
and  American  offers  were  in  balance.  (The  British  case  was  that, 
whilst offers of complete elimination were slight, offers of reductions 
of  preferential  margins  covered  over  forty  per  cent  of  the  US 
requests; and that as most of Britain’s tariffs were already very low, 
even much more generous offers would not compare favourably with 
the kinds of swingeing cuts the Americans could make in their much 
higher tariffs.) He ‘frankly did not think it possible to go further’. He 
said that if the United States felt there was no fair balance of offers 
the only way out would be for the Americans to withdraw some of 
their own offers.66 The Americans were distressed.67
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According to Clair Wilcox, however, when the British and Americans 
reconvened  two  days  later,  ‘The  British  displayed  an  over-zealous 
attitude to cooperate in the establishment of the necessary conditions 
for the revival of world trade. ... Mr. Clayton and Sir Stafford reached 
an understanding on all  outstanding issues.’68 Wilcox attributed the 
apparent change of heart to a reassessment by the British, who, he 
believed,  ‘had  reached  the  conclusion  that  their  attitude  toward 
cooperative  effort  to  reduce  and  eliminate  trade  barriers  was 
alienating the friendship of the United States’ – and had thus taken 
steps to repair the damage.69 Yet, if the British made greater efforts to 
be friendly, their fundamental attitude had not changed in the way 
that the Americans surmised. 
At the beginning of the second meeting, Clayton reminded Cripps of 
the  secret  Anglo-American  agreement  of  1945,  whereby  if  the 
Dominions  were  to  adopt  an  unreasonable  position  regarding  the 
elimination of preferences, the UK would denounce its agreements. 
He had no intention at this stage, he said, of asking the British to do 
this, but was merely stating the facts for the record. Cripps responded 
that ‘he remembered the facts quite well’; and although he continued 
to stress that Britain could not act unilaterally, he also stated ‘that the 
United Kingdom was prepared, if they came to the conclusion that the 
Dominions  were  acting  unreasonably,  to  bring  pressure  on  the 
27
Dominions.’70 This – along with Cripps’s stated willingness to consider 
a  method  whereby  given  preferences  would  be  eliminated 
progressively over a period of five years - seems to have favourably 
impressed the Americans. They seem to have convinced themselves 
that Cripps had agreed to the gradual elimination of preferences, even 
though, as Wilcox acknowledged the very next day, ‘Sir Stafford was 
not  pressed to make definite  commitments with respect  to Empire 
preferences’.71 They overlooked the fact that, even if he was prepared 
to bring pressure to bear on other countries – and in fact he was not 
prepared  to  do  so  to  any  great  extent  -  he  still  laid  emphasis  on 
commonwealth consent. 
The British assessment of the outcome of the meetings was also much 
too sanguine. Cripps told his cabinet colleagues that the UK and US 
offers were in approximate balance, the scales being tipped perhaps 
somewhat in Britain’s favour; it was not, in his view, necessary to go 
much further to meet the Americans, although he would be prepared 
to add ‘a few more concessions of not too substantial a nature ... if it 
finally proves  necessary to do so in order to secure an agreement.’ 
He seems not to have been aware of how much further the Americans 
wanted him to go. He certainly did not believe that he had agreed to 
the elimination of preferences. He believed that he had succeeded in 
making  it  clear  to  Clayton  that  the  countries  at  whose  expense 
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reductions in preference were made – rather than the countries which 
granted preferences –  should be the recipients  of  compensation in 
terms  of  tariff  cuts.  Yet  he  overlooked the  importance  laid  by  the 
Americans on British action to persuade commonwealth countries to 
give  up  the  preferences  they  received:  ‘it  is  in  the  main  for  the 
Americans to persuade them that they have been offered adequate 
advantages in return.’72 
There had, in fact, been a major failure of understanding. This is clear 
from the minutes of a meeting of the US delegation held two weeks 
after the Cripps-Clayton conclave:
the British seem to be taking an entirely different point of view 
with  respect  to  the  agreement  reached  between  Sir  Stafford 
Cripps and Mr. Clayton a short time ago on the elimination of 
Empire preferences. The British now interpret the commitment 
made by Sir Stafford Cripps as meaning that Sir Stafford had 
accepted the US request for the gradual elimination of Empire 
preferences on behalf of the Dominions but without having first 
consulted the Dominions. Consequently, the commitment made 
by the Sir Stafford Cripps is meaningless unless the Dominions 
agree.73
 
In  fact,  Cripps  had made no ‘commitment’;  as  the Americans  now 
realised,  his  position  was  simply  that,  if  the  Dominions  could  be 
persuaded to relinquish the preferences accorded them, he would be 
happy for this to happen. 
In the meantime, Cripps continued to endorse the ITO publicly, to the 
gratification of the Americans.74 However, the UK’s commitment to the 
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project weakened as its economic situation deteriorated. Sterling was 
made convertible on 15 July. In the weeks afterwards, the dollar drain, 
already a major cause of concern, began to accelerate. On 24 July the 
Chancellor, Hugh Dalton, told the cabinet that at the present rate of 
drawing, the US loan might be exhausted by late September.75 On 28 
July,  the  Foreign Office  sent  a  telegram to  the  British  embassy  in 
Washington. Given the chronic dollar situation, it said, Britain would 
‘within the next few months be faced with necessity of having to take 
drastic action to enable us to secure the barest minimum of supplies 
from  overseas  by  means  of  measures  which  would  be  quite 
inconsistent  with  the  Draft  [ITO]  Charter.’  Given  the  proposed 
timetable  for  the  interim General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade 
being signed and coming into force,  it  suggested,  the British were 
faced with a dilemma. They could (a) agree in September to bring into 
force in  November  an  agreement  containing provisions  about  non-
discrimation which they might find themselves unable to carry out 
because they had no dollars, or (b) refuse to agree to any provisions 
about non-discrimination, either in the draft charter or in the GATT, in 
which case a mortal  blow might be struck at  the whole project  of 
bringing the world back to multilateralism. (As things stood, the UK 
was pledged under the loan agreement not to discriminate against the 
USA, but was free to discriminate against other countries.) ‘This is a 
project which we firmly believe is in our long-term interests as much 
of as those of any other country, but in our short-term situation our 
lack of dollars might be over-riding.’76
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At a meeting in Paris,  Cripps put the UK’s message bluntly to the 
Americans, making clear that the UK was desperate and that short-
run  considerations  for  the  time  being  outweighed  all  long-term 
interests.77 The British were now proposing that the GATT, which by 
now  was  largely  complete  in  draft,  should  only  be  initialled  ad 
referendum at Geneva without any definite commitment regarding its 
coming  into  force.  This  would  be  a  body  blow  against  the  whole 
project of trade multilateralism, as it would be very difficult to enact 
the  Geneva  tariff  reductions  without  any  general  rules  governing 
them. Finally it came out that the British would feel able to go ahead 
with  the  GATT  if  the  nondiscrimination  rule  was  only  to  become 
effective  at  the  point  when  the  ITO  charter  came  into  force.  The 
Americans  accepted  that  the  British  should  be  granted  some 
additional breathing space – until  the end of 1948, as it  eventually 
turned out - and the Geneva talks were saved.78 Again, the British had 
used the fact of their own economic weakness as a lever to extract 
concessions from the United States.
Moreover, on 2 August, the American delegation received the long-
awaited authority to cut the wool tariff (by 25%).79 But this did not 
have the hoped-for effect of kick-starting the stalled tariff talks. A new 
US approach to Helmore, involving a short-run relaxation of restraints 
on  discrimination  and  an  easing  of  US  requests  on  preferences, 
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brought no response.80 The Americans now suspected that the British 
were merely paying lip service to the negotiations, whilst intending ‘to 
get away with just as little performance as possible’. They determined 
to go on the offensive, by putting their case to Cripps in London.81 The 
meeting was scheduled for  20 August.  That  day,  convertibility  was 
suspended.  This  was  a  major  blow  at  the  hopes  of  restoring 
multilateral trade. As Harold Wilson commented in November, ‘The 
multilateral, all-convertible trading world envisaged in 1945 crashed 
in the summer’.82 
Clayton’s  meeting  with  Cripps  produced  another  stand-off:  ‘Mr. 
Clayton ... said that in his opinion under the spirit of the arrangement 
entered with the U.K. the United States was entitled to more than the 
U.K. had offered. Sir Stafford replied that the spirit was that the U.K. 
would enter into negotiations.’83 Part of the problem – aside from the 
continuing difficulties of interpreting the 1945 agreement - was that 
they  could  not  agree  a  basis  for  assessing  the  value  of  respective 
concessions. Whereas the Americans made their calculations mainly 
on the basis of the percentage of items on which duties were reduced, 
the British made theirs based on the pre-war value of trade in items 
on  which  duties  were  to  be  bound  or  reduced.  On  this  basis,  the 
British could claim bindings and reductions of rates covering trade 
totalling  £10,095,000  and  £17,453,000  respectively,  as  against  US 
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totals of £8,083,000 and £17,000,000 respectively.84 Clayton produced 
a  short  list  of  ‘essential  demands’  for  eliminations  and  further 
reductions. Cripps – who said that ‘spectacular eliminations’ would be 
politically impossible – promised to refer the list to his colleagues but 
warned that the likely response would be negative. It was always open 
to  the  Americans,  he  reiterated,  to  withdraw  some  of  their  own 
offers.85 
In the wake of the meeting, Cripps told the cabinet that ‘there is no 
doubt  at  all  that  the  Americans  (and  particularly  Mr.  Clayton)  are 
genuinely  convinced that  they  have made a  generous offer’  to  the 
participants  in  the Geneva  talks,  ‘and that  they  have been greatly 
disappointed with the responses they have received.’  The American 
message did at last seem to be getting through, although Cripps was 
still reluctant to go as far as the US side wanted: ‘we should attempt 
to meet the Americans halfway on their new requests (in themselves 
very much less than their original demands) and to endeavour to get 
really  worthwhile  concessions  in  return.’  The  ‘fairly  substantial’ 
concessions  he  now  envisaged  making  were  in  the  form  of 
eliminations  of  preference,  to  which  Clayton  attached  great 
importance, rather than reductions.86 Clearly, the stern US message 
had  produced  some  significant  movement  on  the  British  side. 
Nevertheless, Cripps’s uncompromising demeanour at the 20 August 
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meeting  –  perhaps  adopted  because  he  doubted  that  he  could 
convince his own cabinet colleagues to share his views – disguised 
this  change  of  heart  from the  Americans.  The  British  embassy  in 
Washington warned on 23 August that Clayton had recommended that 
the  United  States  should  break  off  the  multilateral  negotiations  at 
Geneva on the grounds that  the United Kingdom was  unwilling to 
reduce its preferential tariffs; although it was unlikely that this advice 
would be accepted without further efforts to find a solution.87
Ironically, this recommendation came at a point when the multilateral 
negotiations had achieved a substantial success – the completion of 
the draft ITO charter. The Americans had been forced to make some 
significant,  but  not  fatally  damaging,  concessions  over  non-
discrimination, new regional preferences, and the use of quantitative 
restrictions in the interests of economic development.88 The British 
had favoured the freedom to discriminate and to employ quantitative 
restrictions in the interests of solving balance of payments problems; 
but  they  had  worked  with  the  Americans  in  attempting  to  resist 
pressure  from  the  less-developed  nations.  Alarmingly  for  the 
Americans, however, during the round of speeches that marked the 
completion  of  the  draft  agreement,  Harold  Wilson  offered  a  stark 
warning. In the coming months and years, he said, Britain would have 
to use methods which ‘may appear to be opposed to the principles and 
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methods  of  the  draft  charter’.  These  new  methods  would  include 
bilateral agreements.89 
Wilson’s ‘funeral oration’ on multilateralism, made in the light of the 
suspension of convertibility, represented, in terms of Britain’s public 
position,  a  major  change  of  tack.90 He  himself  –  often  prone  to 
exaggerate his own role in events - subsequently claimed in private to 
have been acting on his own initiative.91 Yet it is scarcely conceivable 
that  a  junior  minister  would  have  instigated  such  a  major  policy 
departure  without  the  consent  of  his  superiors,  whose  views, 
undoubtedly,  the  speech  reflected.  Cripps  explained  publicly  a  few 
weeks later that the continued dollar shortage ‘drives us inevitably 
into  the  necessity  of  bilateralism’.92 As  Wilson  later  remarked, 
‘Stafford had begun by being all out for the American policy, but as 
the extent of America’s  real  willingness to make real  contributions 
revealed itself day by day as something smaller and smaller, Stafford 
had changed.’93 
All the same, the extent of the British change of heart should not be 
overstated.  Cripps  certainly  did  not  want  the  tariff  talks  to  break 
down. Indeed, he was taking greater steps than ever before to meet 
the Americans on the elimination of preferences, even while he was 
contemplating new bilateral trade deals with other countries. He had 
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not abandoned hope that the GATT could be signed, and that the ITO 
would in due course come into being. But what he wanted was a ‘thin’ 
multilateral agreement, Britain making as few trade concessions as 
possible, and remaining free to pursue discriminatory methods to the 
maximum possible extent. Thus, in due course, the UK did both sign 
the  GATT,  and  conclude  bilateral  trade  agreements  not  only  with 
individual  commonwealth  countries,  but  with  Denmark,  Sweden, 
Argentina, and the USSR.94
In  the  meantime,  the  Geneva  talks  had  been  running  into  deeper 
trouble.  Cripps’s  revised  list  of  offers  on  preferences  had  met 
opposition from within the British government, on the ground that it 
was excessively generous. Attlee had ‘Grave doubts about the whole 
thing’; there were ‘Vague rumblings’ from Herbert Morrison, the Lord 
President;  the  Commonwealth  Relations  Office  thought  it  would 
‘break  up  the  empire’.95 In  response,  Cripps  modified  the  list  of 
proposed eliminations somewhat,  but otherwise pressed ahead.96 At 
the same time, the government searched for new options in the trade 
field. On 3 September Bevin, after consulting Cripps, floated publicly 
the  notion  of  a  commonwealth  and  empire  customs  union.97 This 
seems to suggest a rather panicky casting around for ideas, and the 
inter-departmental  committee established to  consider  the concept’s 
36
feasibility quickly  saw that it  was not likely to be realisable  under 
existing conditions.98
The Americans too were divided about what to do if, as seemed likely, 
the  British  rejected  the  most  recent  US  demands  without  making 
acceptable counterproposals. Truman shared the State Department’s 
opinion that the best course was ‘to get [the] best agreement possible 
in present highly unfavourable circumstances and reserve part of our 
negotiating position for use at more propitious time by trimming our 
offers  accordingly’  –  exactly  in  the  manner  that  Cripps  had 
suggested.99 Clayton,  however,  was  reluctant  to  settle  for  a  ‘thin’ 
agreement. 
By  9  September,  the  Americans  were  in  receipt  of  the  British 
counterproposals and new offers from the commonwealth. Although 
the  Americans  were  prepared  to  negotiate  on  the  basis  of  the 
Commonwealth  offers,  those  of  the  British  were  found  to  be 
unsatisfactory. (The realisation of this came as shock to the British, 
who had assumed that their attitude would be regarded by the US as 
more conciliatory than that, say, of Australia and New Zealand).100 On 
the  15th,  Clair  Wilcox  gave  a  ‘crackerjack’  speech  to  the 
commonwealth  delegates  in  Geneva.101 He  gave  a  statistical 
presentation,  seeking  to  show  that  the  percentage  of  preferences 
37
covered by the new UK offers was inadequate when measured against 
the percentage of US tariffs on which reductions had been offered. He 
rejected the idea that the Americans should withdraw some of their 
own offers. Yet, he said, the Americans would not yet acknowledge 
failure and would therefore suggest a new approach, relating only to 
the preferences that the UK enjoyed throughout the commonwealth 
and empire. A new list of elimination requests would be presented; 
after  a  three-year  postponement,  the  elimination  would  take  place 
over the course of ten years. Wilcox finished his speech by suggesting 
that  the  alternatives  to  this  approach  –  the  conclusion  of  a  thin 
agreement, or the termination of US negotiations with Britain – would 
both jeopardize the Marshall Plan. His message was clear: if Britain 
did not seize the nettle the Americans would have no alternative but 
to recommend breaking off negotiations.102 
There was, however, a strong element of bluff in this, given that both 
the  State  Department  and  the  President  himself  were  inclined  to 
accept  a  thin  agreement  in  preference  to  breaking-off  discussions 
with the UK. The British, for their part, were aware that the tough 
talk  of  the  Americans  in  Geneva  did  not  necessarily  reflect  US 
government opinion as a whole.103 This made it  easier  for  them to 
maintain  their  own  stubborn  line,  a  fact  which  underlay  Cripps’s 
attitude  when,  on  19  September,  he  met  with  Clayton  in  London. 
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There  was  the  by  now  familiar  wrangling  over  the  correct 
interpretation  of  Article  VII,  the  loan  agreement,  Attlee’s  1945 
Commons  statement,  and  the  precise  meaning  of  ‘adequate 
compensation’. After denouncing the UK offers as ‘totally inadequate’, 
Clayton handed over his proposal for gradual eliminations over the 
long-term.
Sir Stafford said that he was prepared to put forward the U.S. 
proposal  to  the  Cabinet  but  that  he  would  feel  obliged  to 
recommend them not  to  accept  it.  He  said  that  it  would  be 
“quite impossible to put over anything substantially more than 
has been done”. He stated that there was a large number of 
people who would not shed tears if the negotiations broke down 
altogether.104
Following the meeting,  Clayton and Douglas decided that the 
situation was now so fraught with danger that they should have a talk 
with Bevin, before Cripps made his recommendation to the cabinet. 
This meeting (referred to at the start of this article), which Cripps also 
attended, took place on 22 September. Bevin’s private secretary noted 
in his diary: ‘A busy day in the Office, with Clayton and Douglas next 
door  trying  to  blackmail  E.B.  and  Cripps  into  dropping  imperial 
preference  under threat  of  no  help  for  Britain  under  the  Marshall 
Plan.’105 Bevin hit back strongly:
The Foreign Secretary said that he did not think he could be 
much influenced in this matter by the Marshall offer. ... If the 
US felt  unable to grant us aid because of our attitude in the 
Geneva negotiations that was their affair. The Marshall Plan was 
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a US plan and if it now broke down they would suffer. He also 
pointed  out  that  if  the  US  publicly  accused  this  country  of 
repudiating its obligations we should be bound to state our side 
of the case.106
Bevin can hardly  have been as indifferent to the US threats as he 
made out. He may, however, have found them unconvincing. He and 
Cripps may have thought that Clayton did not have the authority to 
pull the plug on the Marshall Plan – the exclusion of the British being 
likely to lead to its collapse - and that the less ‘fanatical’ elements in 
the  State  Department  would  ultimately  override  him,  allowing  a 
bargain  on  preferences  along  the  lines  that  Cripps  wanted. 
Nevertheless,  in  his  advice  to  the  cabinet,  Cripps  conceded  the 
possibility  that  Clayton,  ‘exasperated  by  the  frustration  of  his 
undoubtedly  sincere  hopes’,  might  ‘induce  his  colleagues  to  do  in 
haste what they may regret at  leisure.’ He put his faith in the idea of 
an appeal direct to Marshall, and asked for authority to refuse further 
concessions  and  notify  Clayton  accordingly.  The  cabinet  readily 
granted it. Cripps sent a letter to Clayton, saying that to agree to the 
American proposals would mean promising to take action three years 
later in circumstances which could not be foreseen, without adequate 
concessions in return.107 Douglas feared this letter would be viewed in 
Washington  as  ‘a  flat  repudiation’,  and  asked  that  the  text  be 
amended.108 Cripps refused to modify it, although he stressed that the 
British would remain open to new approaches.109 
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Nevertheless,  the  situation,  which  appeared  dire,  was  rescued. 
Winthrop Brown had become convinced that the overall results of the 
tariff negotiations between all countries were so great that they could 
not  be  lost:  ‘This  total  accomplishment  just  had  to  be  saved 
somehow.’110 On  Tuesday  1  October,  in  Geneva,  he  approached 
Helmore for a private talk. He said that he had endeavoured to secure 
from Washington a promise that no message breaking off negotiations 
would be sent until  after the week-end.  He hoped that before that 
point,  he  and  Helmore  could  work  out,  without  commitment, 
something  which  both  men  could  recommend  to  their  respective 
governments.  Helmore was cautious,  but agreed to spend the next 
two days in intensive one-to-one discussions with Brown.111 
The  proposals  that  Brown  and  Helmore  came  up  with  involved 
abandoning the US plan for the gradual  elimination of preferences 
over thirteen years. Britain’s 9 September offers would stand, but – 
without disturbing the overall balance of the Anglo-US offers – she 
would  make  some  adjustments  so  as  to  increase  the  number  of 
preference  eliminations.  Moreover,  in  return  for  an  all-round 
reduction of 25% in the margins of preference that Britain enjoyed in 
the colonies, the USA would make a concession on its rubber mixing 
regulations.112 Helmore travelled back to the UK to try and sell the 
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proposals to his political masters. Wilson – newly appointed President 
of the Board of Trade - felt that they were economically sound, but 
believed they would present major political difficulties, particularly in 
respect of the proposed reduction in the preference that Rhodesian 
tobacco  received  in  the  British  market.  Cripps  –  now Minister  for 
Economic Affairs -  was non-committal. However, when he and Wilson 
met with Bevin on 8 October the latter rejected outright the all-round 
reduction  in  colonial  preferences.  He  refused  to  reconsider  this 
decision and was supported by Cripps.113 The next day, the cabinet 
approved the proposals, minus the colonial concession.114
The Americans, however, were insistent that the colonial concession 
must stand.115 Five days later, the British agreed, clearing the way for 
the  signature  of  the  GATT  on  30  October.   Indeed,  from  the 
perspective of Cripps and the British, the arguments in favour of the 
compromise were overwhelming. The Helmore-Brown proposals did 
very  little  to  undermine  the  imperial  preference  system  (which 
remained in existence until Britain joined the EEC). They involved no 
future  commitment  which  Britain  might  find  herself  unable  to 
implement when it matured. Britain’s hands were not tied with regard 
to the future except to the extent that she was already committed to 
the elimination of preferences on a ‘mutually advantageous’ basis. The 
concessions which Britain was asked to make might be painful, but 
their  effects  were  measurable  and  finite.  They  were  thus  far  less 
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objectionable  to  the British  than the previous  American offer.116 In 
addition to this,  agreement  would help prevent  a  rupture with the 
Americans  that  would  be damaging in  the extreme.  In  comparison 
with  this  danger,  the economic and political  effects of  the  colonial 
concession  were  of  little  significance.117 The  bold  attitude  of  the 
British,  which  combined  reminders  of  the  UK’s  own  economic 
weakness with protestations of indifference to American threats, had 
paid off. 
The  conclusion  of  the  Geneva  negotiations  represented  a  major 
achievement. Not only had the American tariff had been reduced to its 
lowest level since 1913, securing substantial  reciprocal concessions 
from other countries, but, as Gardner has noted, the GATT itself had a 
significance  which  went  beyond  the  specific  tariff  and  preference 
concessions. It provided a forum for the discussion of trade problems 
and a mechanism for future trade negotiations, as well as providing a 
set of commercial policy principles to ensure that tariff concessions 
would not be offset by other types of trade restriction.118 Although it 
was supposed to be an interim agreement, it survived for the best part 
of fifty years, before being superseded by the WTO. It was a major 
contributant to the growth of world trade post-WWII, growth which in 
turn contributed to the prosperity of the 1945-73 era.
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But if the outcome of the Geneva talks was a success, it is tempting to 
ask why the process of negotiation itself was so agonising, and why 
the  discussions  came  so  close  to  breakdown.  At  the  start  of  the 
conference  in  April,  nobody  had  imagined  that  it  would  continue 
throughout  the  summer.119 To  some  degree,  there  had  been  an 
underestimate  of  the  technical  difficulties  that  would  be  involved; 
certainly,  subsequent  GATT  rounds  did  not  get  any  shorter.  But 
political  problems also played a major part  in dragging things out. 
Some  of  these  problems  were  external  to  the  negotiations,  in  the 
sense  that  they  could  only  be  resolved  by  actions  away  from the 
immediate context  of  Geneva.  Congress’s  action on the wool  tariff, 
and the UK’s profound economic crisis, are the key examples. There 
were also problems internal to the talks. The British took a long time 
to wake up to the reality of the American position. Not until August 
did Cripps seem to realise that he would have to come up with new 
concessions  in  order  to  reach  a  deal,  and  even  then  his  cabinet 
colleagues were hard to persuade. 
There was, furthermore, a major cleavage in view between the views 
of the British and the Americans. There was also a mistrust by British 
politicians of the Board of Trade officials in Geneva, whom, it was felt, 
were  insufficiently  wary  of  their  US  counterparts.  These  facts  are 
clear from private comments made by Harold Wilson in early October:
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he thought James Helmore very clever but felt that he had come 
to place excessive importance on a successful outcome of the 
tariff negotiations. He said James had got almost too close to the 
Americans.  Also,  of  course,  any  person  in  charge  of  any 
negotiation  was  apt  to  come  to  believe  that  success  in  that 
particular thing was vital, in short to lose somewhat a sense of 
proportion.  Many  of  the  Americans  involved,  the  nicest  of 
fellows, had been on the job so long that they too had begun to 
think more of a successful outcome of their long labours than of 
the real merits of the resulting arrangement in a world which 
had changed a great deal since Cordell Hull saturated the State 
Department at Washington with his almost religious convictions 
on the subject of Tariff reductions. The Americans at Geneva, he 
thought, tended to fail to see the world as it really was today.120
As  Gardner  has  argued,  the  US  emphasis  on  the  ‘elimination’  of 
preferences – on which Clayton in particular put so much emphasis – 
served to alienate British opinion and to distract attention from the 
broad  advantages  likely  to  be  obtained  from  a  multilateral 
settlement.121 In  addition,  American  confusion  about  the  precise 
nature of Britain’s obligations led to the accusation, which was not 
fully justified, that the British were repudiating their agreements. This 
accusation was guaranteed to cause bad feeling, and helped edge the 
talks near to breakdown. 
Furthermore,  as  the  Canadian  ambassador  to  the  United  States 
commented  at  the  beginning  of  October,  ‘It  is  evident  that  the 
temperamental differences between Clayton and Cripps have grown 
to a point at which they constitute a real obstacle to agreement.’122 
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Therefore,  it  fell  to  officials  further  down  the  ladder  to  work  out 
proposals  which,  in  the  end,  proved  acceptable  to  both  sides. 
Nevertheless, Cripps does deserve a substantial measure of credit for 
the  end  result.  However  stubborn  he  may  have  appeared  to  the 
Americans, he never shut the door on new approaches; indeed, once it 
became clear to him that more British concessions were needed, he 
pressed his ministerial colleagues to go much further than they would 
have wished. 
Overall, though, consideration of Cripps’s general attitude to the talks 
provides further support  to  the argument  that  there was no warm 
embrace  by  the  Attlee  government  of  the  American  position  on 
trade.123 And  at  a  broader  level,  the  Geneva  talks  episode  raises 
questions about the nature and extent of US hegemony during this 
period.  The  US  failure  to  secure  the  abolition  of  the  imperial 
preference system as the price of post-war aid to Britain suggests an 
important failure of hegemonic imposition. This, on the face of it, is 
surprising,  given  that  the  USA  was  so  much  more  politically  and 
economically powerful than the UK. One is bound to ask, then, why 
the  methods  that  the  Americans  used  to  persuade  the  British  to 
comply with their wishes did not work.
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The artifice that Clayton and Douglas employed at their 22 September 
1947  meeting  with  Cripps  and  Bevin  was  evidently  not  blackmail. 
They  were  not  demanding  money  in  return  for  concealing 
discreditable British secrets. They were attempting to use – although 
they  did  not  think  of  it  in  these  terms  –  the  device  of  policy-
conditioned aid. They wanted, in exchange for making Marshall aid 
available to the UK, a change of British commercial policy on trade 
preferences  for  the  commonwealth  and  empire.  Since  then,  the 
instrument of policy-conditioned aid has undergone more than fifty 
years  of  evolution,  both  in  bilateral  and  in  multilatreal  lending 
contexts.124 In view of the current scepticism about the effectiveness 
of aid conditionality,125 it is significant that this early example of its 
use  was  a  spectacular  failure.  Indeed,  the attempt  to  employ  it  in 
1947 was only necessary because an earlier attempt – the US effort to 
make the 1945 loan conditional on a substantial  contraction of the 
imperial preference system – had already failed. 
Clayton and Douglas’s method did not work largely because the US 
government had multiple objectives. Its desire for some form of trade 
agreement  and  its  wish  to  include Britain  in  a  European  recovery 
programme  ultimately  proved  stronger  than  its  dislike  of  the 
continuation  of  the  imperial  preference  system.  The  Attlee 
government, although its conduct of the negotiations was by no means 
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infallibly sure-footed, was able to exploit this situation in an effective 
manner. This victory for David over Goliath was explicable in large 
part  by the problems inherent in the seemingly  powerful  device of 
attaching policy conditions to large-scale foreign aid.
Wider lessons can also be drawn. In recent years, scholars have been 
increasingly  willing  to  emphasise  the  limitations  of  using  US 
‘hegemonic power’ as an explanation for the emergence of the post-
WWII international economic order. As G. John Ikenberry has noted, 
‘the system was shaped by Great  Britain as  well  as  by the United 
States  and  in  ways  that  would  be  unanticipated  by  simple 
considerations of power.’126 The Geneva episode supports this claim. It 
shows that (as Peter Burnham has argued with respect to the 1945 
loan agreement) the United States was on important occasions unable 
to  translate  its  economic power  into  particular  desired negotiating 
outcomes.127 The Attlee government – steadfast, and sometimes almost 
quixotic,  in  its  determination  -   did  not  capitulate  to  American 
dominance. This is by no means to say that the overall result of the 
talks was unsatisfactory to the Americans, but merely that, for them, 
the  achievement  of  a  successful  all-round  outcome  necessarily 
involved  compromise  with  individual,  far  less  powerful,  allies.  The 
failure of Clayton and Douglas’s attempt to force Cripps and Bevin to 
surrender imperial preference thus demonstrated that power does not 
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merely  result  from  the  possession  of  superior  resources.  It  is  a 
product of how those resources are wielded, and the attitudes and 
capabilities of  those over whom one would exercise  it.  Coercion is 
rarely the straightforward solution it may sometimes appear.
49
1 I would like to thank Till Geiger, John Toye and two anonymous referees for comments on an 
earlier draft of this article. I would also like to thank James N. Miller for supplying me with copies 
of material from the Harry S. Truman Library in advance of my own visit, for allowing me to read 
sections of his Ph.D. thesis prior to submission, and for many useful discussions.  Errors that 
remain are, of course, my own responsibility.
2 Public  Record Office,  Kew, London (hereafter  PRO) BT 11/3647,  ‘Note by President [of  the 
Board of Trade]’, 22 September 1947.
3 See Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary 1945-1951 (London, 1983),  p. 462.
4 For a compelling account of Labour’s attitude to imperialism during this period, see D.K. 
Fieldhouse, ‘The Labour Governments and the Empire-Commonwealth’, in Ritchie Ovendale (ed.), 
The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Governments 1945-1951 (Leicester, 1984), pp. 83-120.
5 For  general  accounts,  see  Peter  Hennessy,  Never  Again:  Britain  1945-51 (London  1992); 
Kenneth  O.  Morgan,  Labour  in  Power,  1945-51 (Oxford,  1984);  Henry  Pelling,  The  Labour 
governments, 1945-51 (London, 1984). For accounts focusing on economic policy as a whole, see 
Alec  Cairncross,  Years  of  Recovery:  British  economic  policy,  1945-51 (London,  1985);  G.D.N. 
Worswick  and  P.H.  Ady,  The  British  Economy  1945-1950 (Oxford,  1952);  J.C.R.  Dow,  The 
Management of  the British Economy 1945-60 (Cambridge,  1964);  Jim Tomlinson,  Democratic 
Socialism and  economic  policy:  The  Attlee  years  1945-51 For  accounts  focusing  on  external 
economic policy, see Teddy Brett, Steve Gilliatt and Andrew Pople, ‘Planned trade, Labour party 
policy  and  US  intervention:  the  successes  and  failures  of  post-war  reconstruction’,  History 
Workshop  Journal xiii  (Spring  1982),  130-42,  and  Peter  Burnham,  The  Political  Economy  of 
Postwar Reconstruction (Basingstoke and London, 1990). 
6 Richard N. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy diplomacy in current perspective: The origins 
and prospects of our international order (New York, 1980), pp. 354-67. 
7 See James N. Miller and Richard Toye, ‘Personality, Ideology and Interest in the Origins of the 
Modern World Trading System: The Case of Stafford Cripps and Will Clayton’, in Frank Ninkovich 
(ed.), Global America, forthcoming.
8 Thomas W. Zeiler,  Free Trade Free World: The Advent of GATT (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 
1999).
9 Marguerite Dupree (ed.), Lancashire and Whitehall: The Diary of Raymond Streat Volume Two:  
1939-57, (Manchester, 1987), p. 316 (entry for 8 Jan. 1946), See also Richard Toye, The Labour 
Party and the Planned Economy, 1931-1951 (London, 2002, forthcoming), Chapter 7.
10 This article therefore lends support to the critique of hegemonic stability theory put forward by 
Peter Burnham in  The Political Economy of Postwar Reconstruction, and in ‘Re-evaluating the 
Washington Loan Agreement: a revisionist view of the limits of postwar American power’, Review 
of International Studies 18 (1992), pp. 241-59.
11 See  James  N.  Miller,  ‘The  Pursuit  of  A  Talking  Shop:  Political  Origins  of  American 
Multilateralism, 1934 – 1945’, Paper presented to the 25th Meetings of the Eastern Economics 
Association,  March,  1999;  or  for  a  fuller  discussion,  see  Miller,  ‘Wartime  Origins  of 
Multilateralism, 1939 – 1945”’ unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Cambridge, 2002; 
and also Miller and Toye, ‘Cripps and Clayton’.
12 D.E. Moggridge, Maynard Keynes: An Economist’s Biography (London, 1992), pp.  667-8.
13 Susan Howson (ed.), The Collected Papers of James Meade Volume III: International Economics 
(London, 1988), pp. 27-35.
14 Miller, ‘Wartime Origins of Multilateralism’.
15 See Toye, Labour Party, Chapter 7.
16 PRO CAB 127/91, Stafford Cripps to Richard Law, 30 Dec. 1943.
17 Susan Howson and Donald Moggridge (eds.), The Collected Papers of James Meade Volume IV: 
The Cabinet Office Diary 1944-46 (London, 1990), p. 106 (entry for 8 July 1945).
18 In the immediate post-war years, the commonwealth entered a state of flux, not least as a 
consequence of the move to Indian independence. The term ‘Imperial Commonwealth’ had been 
in  use  as  early  as  1917.  In  1931,   the  Statute  of  Westminster  formalised  the  1926  Balfour 
Definition, whereby the six Dominions then existing – the ‘autonomous communities within the 
British Empire’ - were recognised as ‘members of the British Commonwealth of Nations’. In 1949, 
by which time there had been changes in membership, ‘British’ was dropped from the formal 
usage, and India became associated with the commonwealth as an independent republic. Britain, 
of  course,  also  retained  colonies,  which,  like  the  commonwealth  countries,  received  trade 
preferences  in  the  British  market.  See  Alan  Palmer,  Dictionary  of  the  British  Empire  and 
Commonwealth (London, 1996), pp. vii-viii, 26, 211, 271, 355-6.
19 See  Cripps’s  comments  on  this  subject:  United  States  National  Archives,  College  Park, 
Maryland  (hereafter  NA),  RG  43  ‘Memorandum  of  Conversation:  United  States  and  United 
Kingdom Tariff Offers’, 12 July 1947, International Trade Files (hereafter ITF) Box 83, and PRO 
BT 11/3646,  draft  British record of  meeting,  12 July 1947.  See also Gardner,  Sterling-Dollar 
Diplomacy, pp. 154-5.
20 See Tim Rooth, ‘Britain’s Other Dollar Problem: Economic Relations with Canada, 1945-50, 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 27, No. 1, January 1999, pp. 81-108.
21 Ross M. Robertson, History of the American Economy (3rd edn.,  New York, 1973), pp. 663-4.
22 Walter Johnson and Carol Evans (eds.), The Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson Volume II: Washington 
to Springfield 1941-1948 (Boston, 1973), p. 258 (diary entry for 5-10 Sept. 1945)
23 For a more detailed discussion, see Toye and Miller, ‘Cripps and Clayton’.
24 Susan Howson and Donald Moggridge (eds.), The Wartime Diaries of Lionel Robbins and James 
Meade, 1943-45 (Basingstoke, 1990), p. 226 (entry for 2 Oct. 1945).
25 See Roger Bullen and M.E. Pelly (eds.), Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series I , 
Volume III (London, 1986), p. 200; Toye and Miller, ‘Cripps and Clayton’.
26 Cmnd.  6709,  ‘Proposals  for  Consideration  by  an  International  Conference  on  Trade  and 
Employment’, 6 Dec. 1945.
27 See Miller and Toye, ‘Cripps and Clayton’.
28 Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS) 1945, VI, p. 152.
29 PRO BT 11/2800, Telegram from Board of Trade to Washington, 22 Oct. 1945,.
30 Parliamentary Debates House of Commons 5th series vol. 416, 6 Dec. 1945, col. 2668.
31 PRO BT 11/2809, Telegram NABOB 308 J S M Washington to Cabinet Office (from Percivale 
Liesching) 8 Nov. 1945.
32 See Francine McKenzie, ‘Renegotiating a Special Relationship: The Commonwealth and Anglo-
American  Economic  Discussions,  September-December  1945’,  The  Journal  of  Imperial  and 
Commonwealth History, Vol. 26, No. 3, September 1998, pp.71-93, at pp. 72-3.
33 Although it has not proved possible to locate a copy of this statement in either the US National 
Archives or the British Public Record Office, in July 1947 Clayton reminded the British in detail of 
what had occurred. They did not dissent from the account that he gave. NA RG 43 ‘Memorandum 
of Conversation: United States and United Kingdom Tariff Offers (continued)’, 14 July 1947, ITF 
Box 83.
34 PRO  T247/2,  Stafford  Cripps,  ‘Commercial  Policy  and  the  Lend  Lease  Negotiations  at 
Washington” 13 Sept. 1945.
35 PRO CAB 128/4 CM(45)57th 29 Nov. 1945 (confidential annex); R.W.B. Clarke diary 6 Mar. 1946, 
R.W.B. Clarke papers 25, Churchill College, Cambridge. See also Dupree,  Streat Diary,  p. 316 
(entry for 8 Jan. 1946).
36 PRO FO 371/62887, Telegram from Cripps to Bevin, 21 March 1947.
37 Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy, pp. 351-4.
38 Cripps to Attlee, 8 Mar. 1947, Austin Robinson papers, Churchill College, Cambridge, ADDNL 7 
ii).
39 See Toye, Labour Party, Chapter 7.
40 For an account of his life, see Gregory A. Fossedal, Our Finest Hour: Will Clayton, the Marshall 
Plan, and the Triumph of Democracy (Stanford, California, 1993).
41 See,  for  example,  Judith  Goldstein,  ‘Creating  the  GATT  Rules:  Politics,  Institutions,  and 
American Policy’, in John Gerard Ruggie (ed.), Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of 
an Institutional Form (New York, 1993), pp. 201-232, at p. 202.
42 Speech by Cripps at the opening of the Geneva conference, 11 Apr. 1947, Robinson Papers 
6/6/3. For a general round-up of the first week’s comment in the US press, including reactions to 
Cripps’s  speech,  see  NA  RG  59  560.AL/4-1547,  Telegram  from  State  Department  to  US 
Delegation in Geneva, Apr. 1947. Items of particular interest in the British press can be found in 
The Spectator, 11 Apr. 1947, Tribune, 11 Apr. 1947, and the Manchester Guardian, 12 Apr. 1947.
43 PRO FO 371/62291 Telegram from UK delegation in Geneva to the Foreign Office, 12 Apr. 
1947.
44 PRO BT 11/3649, Telegram from Board of Trade to UK delegation in Geneva (Harold Wilson to 
J.C. Helmore), 16 Apr. 1947.
45 Winthrop G. Brown oral history, p. 22, Harry S.Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.
46 NA RG 59 560.AL/5/647, Telegram from US delegation in Geneva to State Department, 6 May 
1947.
47 The  Americans,  at  the  start  of  the  talks,  discerned  weaknesses  in  the  ‘extremely  badly 
organized’ UK delegation. They noted that that little discretion had been given to the British 
negotiating teams, and that there seemed to have been little, if any, coordination between the 
earlier preparation of requests and the preparation of offers. NA RG 43 ‘Minutes of Delegation 
Meeting’, 5 May 1947, ITF Box 133.
48 Zeiler, Free Trade Free World, p. 100.
49 NA RG 43, ‘Minutes of delegation meeting’, 29 April 1947, ITF Box 133.
50 FRUS 1947, I, p. 926.
51 PRO BT 11/2828 OEP (47) 29, Stafford Cripps, ‘The Trade Negotiations at Geneva’, 22 July 
1947.
52 William L. Clayton, ‘GATT, the Marshall Plan, and OECD’, Political Science Quarterly 78 (1963), 
pp. 493-503, at pp. 493-4.
53 FRUS 1947, I, p. 916.
54 Clayton, ‘GATT, The Marshall Plan, and OECD’, p. 495. See also Zeiler, Free Trade Free World, 
pp. 101-2.
55 FRUS 1947, I, pp. 937-941.
56 J.R.C. Helmore to Clayton 14 May 1947, Robinson Papers 6/6/2; FRUS 1947, I, pp. 945-7.
57 NA RG 59 560.AL/6-1247, Telegram from US Embassy in London to Secretary of State, 12 June 
1947.
58 Robin Barrington-Ward diary, 23 June 1947, copy in Stafford Cripps Papers, Nuffield College, 
Oxford.
59 Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy, pp. 332-6.
60 PRO BT11/3649 Telegram from Foreign Office to UK Delegation in Geneva (No. 838 FO), 28 
June 1947.
61 NA RG 43 Clair Wilcox to Paul Nitze, 12 July 1947, ITF Box 149.
62 FRUS 1947 Vol. I , pp. 953-4.
63 PRO  FO  371/62305,  TN(P)(SPECIAL)(CHARTER)(47)13,  ‘Non-Discrimination:  Brief  for  the 
President of the Board of Trade’, 10 July 1947.
64 NA RG 43, Clair Wilcox to Paul Nitze 12 July 1947, ITF Box 149, and minutes of US delegation 
at Geneva, 10 July 1947, ITF Box 133.
65 NA RG 43, Minutes of US delegation at Geneva, 14 July 1947, ITF Box 133.
66 The US record of this section of the meeting is NA RG 43 ‘Memorandum of Conversation: 
United States and United Kingdom Tariff Offers’,  12 July 1947, ITF Box 83. The draft British 
record, dated 12 July 1947, can be found in PRO BT 11/3646. See also PRO BT 11/3646, Telegram 
from UK Delegation in Geneva to the Foreign Office, 16 July 1947 (telegram c: ‘Anglo American 
Tariff Negotiations’) and NA RG 43, minutes of meeting of US delegation, 14 July 1947, ITF Box 
133. As the Americans subsequently pointed out, the suggestion that if United States did not like 
the UK offers they should reduce their own was inconsistent with the previous British argument 
that United States concessions should, in order to achieve a proper balance, be better than those 
of other countries. See PRO FO 371/62313, Telegram from Washington to the Foreign Office, 23 
August 1947.
67 FRUS 1947, I, p. 965.
68 NA RG 43, Minutes of US delegation at Geneva, 15 July 1947, ITF Box 133; see also NA RG 43 
Postcript dated 14 July 1947, on  letter from Clair Wilcox to Paul Nitze, 12 July 1947,  ITF Box. 
149.
69 FRUS 1947, I, p. 965.
70 NA RG 43, ‘Memorandum of Conversation: United States and United Kingdom Tariff Offers 
(continued)’, 14 July 1947, ITF Box 83.
71 NA RG 43, Minutes of US delegation at Geneva, 15 July 1947, ITF Box 133.
72 PRO BT 11/2828 OEP (47) 29, Stafford Cripps, ‘The Trade Negotiations at Geneva’, 22 July 
1947; see also PRO BT 11/3646, Telegram from UK Delegation in Geneva to the Foreign Office, 
16 July 1947 (telegram c: ‘Anglo American Tariff Negotiations’)
73 NA RG 43, ‘Minutes of General Staff Meeting’, 30 July 1947, ITF Box 133.
74 PRO FO 371/62305 Telegram from UK delegation in Geneva to Foreign Office, 14 July 1947; 
FRUS  1947,  I,  p. 965;  NA RG 59 560.AL/7-1847,  Telegram from US delegation in Geneva to 
Secretary of State, 18 July 1947.
75 Ben Pimlott, Hugh Dalton (London, 1985), pp. 482-3.
76 PRO CAB 21/2202, Telegram from FO to Washington embassy, 28 July 1947.
77 NA RG 59 560.AL/8-147, Geneva to Secretary of State (for Robert Lovett from Clayton), 1 Aug. 
1947.
78 FRUS 1947, I, pp. 967-973. 
79 FRUS 1947, I, pp. 972-4; Zeiler, Free Trade Free World,  pp. 102-3.
80 FRUS 1947, I, pp. 974-6.
81 NA RG 59 560.AL/8-1147, Telegram from Geneva to Secretary of State (for Lovett from 
Clayton), 11 Aug. 1947.
82 Harold Wilson, ‘Paying Our Way Abroad’, in Douglas Jay et al,  The Road to Recovery: Fabian 
Society Lectures given in the autumn of 1947 (London, 1948),  pp. 89-98 at p. 97.
83 NA RG 43, ‘Memorandum of Conversation: Preferences the United Kingdom enjoys in 
Commonwealth and Empire countries’, 20 August 1947. For the British account, see PRO CAB 
129/20 CP(47)245, Cripps, ‘Trade Negotiations in Geneva: U.S. Requests on Tariffs and 
Preferences’, 27 Aug. 1947, Annex C. See also FRUS 1947, I, pp. 977-9.
84 PRO CAB 129/20 CP(47)245, Cripps, ‘Trade Negotiations in Geneva’, 27 Aug. 1947, Annex F.
85 NA RG 43, ‘Memorandum of Conversation: Preferences the United Kingdom enjoys in 
Commonwealth and Empire countries’, 20 Aug. 1947; PRO CAB 129/20 CP(47)245, Cripps, ‘Trade 
Negotiations in Geneva’, 27 Aug. 1947, Annex C. 
86 PRO CAB 129/20 CP(47)245, Cripps, ‘Trade Negotiations in Geneva’, 27 Aug. 1947.
87 See PRO FO 371/62313 Telegram from Washington to the Foreign Office, 23 Aug. 1947. It is, of 
course, possible that this very warning,  or  other informal  indications,  stiffened Cripps in his 
resolve to offer concessions, given that his recommendations were not circulated to the cabinet 
until four days after it was received. 
88 Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy, pp. 361-7; Report of the Second Session of the Preparatory 
Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment (document E/PC/T/186), 
WTO archive, Geneva. See also JohnToye and RichardToye, Intellectual History of the United 
Nations Vol. 2 (Bloomington, Indiana, forthcoming), Chapter 2.
89 Speech by Wilson at the second session of the preparatory  committee of the UN conference on 
trade and employment, 6th meeting, 23 August 1947, WTO archive, Geneva; Gardner,  Sterling-
Dollar Diplomacy, p. 357;
90 John Jewkes, Ordeal By Planning (London, 1948) , p. 231. 
91 Dupree, Streat Diary, p. 414 (entry for 8 Oct. 1947).
92 NA RG 59, Telegram from US embassy in London to Secretary of State, 18 Sept. 1947, giving 
details of a speech by Cripps the previous day.
93 Dupree, Streat Diary, p. 414 (entry for 8 Oct. 1947). Robert Hall, the recently appointed head 
of the Economic Section, who was to become one of Cripps’s key advisers, shared the belief that 
multilateralism was impractical given post-war conditions. Alec Cairncross (ed.), The Robert Hall 
Diaries, 1947-1953 (London 1989), p. 5 (entry for 15 Sept. 1947).
94 Harold Wilson, Post-War Economic Policies in Britain (London, 1957), pp. 4-5.
95 PRO FO 371/62314 M, Minute by F.W. Marten, 4 Sept. 1947. See also PRO BT 64/2346 Arthur 
G. Bottomley to Cripps, 1 Sept. 1947.
96 PRO BT 64/2346, Cripps to Attlee, 4 Sept. 1947.
97 Trades Union Congress Annual Report, 1947, p. 421; PRO FO 800/444, Bevin to Attlee 5 Sept. 
1947. See also PRO FO 800/444 P.K. 47/128,  Minute from Bevin to Attlee (copied to Dalton, 
Cripps and others), 16 Sept. 1947.
98 Alan S. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51 (London, 1984), pp. 243-4.
99 FRUS 1947, I, pp. 980-1.
100 FRUS 1947, I, pp. 982; Documents on Canadian External Relations, 13, 1947, p. 1171.
101 Wilson T.M. Beale, Jr. to ‘Yogsie’, 17 September 1947, Wilson T.M. Beale, Jr. Papers, Truman 
Library. I am grateful to James N. Miller for this reference.
102 FRUS 1947 Vol. I, pp. 983-93. See also PRO BT 64/2346 Telegram from Foreign Office to UK 
delegation in Geneva, 27 Sept. 1947.
103 PRO BT 11/3647, ‘American Tariff discussions: Note of a meeting in the President [of the Board 
of Trade]’s Room at 9.30 a.m. on Friday, September 19th [1947]’
104 NA RG 43, ‘Memorandum of Conversation: United States and United Kingdom Offers’,  19 
Sept. 1947, ITF Box 83; PRO BT 64/2346 TN(P)(SPECIAL)93, ‘Trade Negotiations Committee: 
Note by the Secretariat:  Annex:  Trade Negotiations with USA: Note of Meeting between Mr. 
Clayton and the President of the Board of Trade [on 19 September 1947]’; FRUS 1947, I, pp. 993-
5; PRO BT 64/2346 TN(P)(SPECIAL)(47)92, ‘US attack on Preferences: Note by the Secretariat: 
Annex  IV:  Memorandum handed to  Sir  Stafford Cripps  by  Mr.  Clayton [dated  19 September 
1947]’,  22  Sept.  1947;  PRO  FO  371/62317,  Helmore  to  C.A.P.  Brown,  enclosing  notes  re. 
Clayton’s arguments, 20 Sept. 1947: Note (a) ‘The 1945 Undertakings’.
105 Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary, p. 462.
106 PRO BT 64/2346 Telegram from Foreign Office to UK delegation in Geneva, 27 Sept. 1947. For 
the American account of the meeting – which does not record these words of Bevin on the subject 
of the Marshall Plan – see FRUS 1947, I, pp. 995-6.
107 PRO CAB 129/21 CP(47)266, Cripps, ‘The Tariff Negotiations at Geneva’, 24 Sept. 1947; PRO 
CAB 128/10 CM(47)77th, 25 Sept. 1947; FRUS 1947, I,  pp. 998-1003.
108 PRO FO 371/62318 UE 9021/37/G ‘Conversation With the United States  Ambassador:  Mr. 
Bevin to Lord Inverchapel’, 25 Sept. 1947.
109 PRO FO 371/62318, Edmund Hall-Patch, ‘Tariffs and Preferences’, 26 Sept. 1947.
110 Brown oral history,  p. 27.
111 PRO FO 371 62319 Telegram from UK Delegation Geneva (Helmore) to Foreign Office, 2 Oct. 
1947.
112 This meant that the proportion of synthetic rubber which, under US rules, had to be combined 
with natural rubber would be reduced. This would boost sales of natural rubber from Britain’s 
colonial empire.  FRUS 1947, I, pp. 1006-7; PRO CAB 129/21 CP(47)278, Harold Wilson, ‘Trade 
Negotiations in Geneva: Tariff Discussions with the USA’, 6 Oct. 1947.
113 PRO BT 11/3648, TN(P)(47)149th Meeting: Minutes of the 149th  meeting of the UK delegation 
held in two parts on 10 and 11 Oct.  1947;  PRO BT 11/3648 Helmore to Wilson, ‘Tariffs  and 
Preferences’, 7 Oct. 1947; PRO FO 800/861, Bevin’s engagement diary for 1947 (entry for 8 Oct.). 
114 Zeiler, Free Trade Free World, p. 119.
115 FRUS 1947, I, p. 1010; PRO BT 11/3648, Telegram from Foreign Office to UK delegation in 
Geneva, 11 Oct. 1947; NA RG 59 560.AL/10-1047, ‘Memorandum of Conversation [between 
Marshall and Inverchapel]: Geneva Trade Negotiations’, 10 Oct. 1947.
116 PRO FO 371/62321, Memo by Hall-Patch (to Bevin) on imperial preference, 7 Oct. 1947.
117 PRO CAB 129/21 CP(47)278 Harold Wilson, ‘Trade Negotiations in Geneva: Tariff Discussions 
with the USA’, 6 Oct. 1947.
118 Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy, p. 361.
119 Antony Gilpin memoirs, ‘Chapter 10: Geneva’, United Nations Career Records Papers MS 
Eng.4676 f.14, Bodleian Library, Oxford
120 Dupree, Streat Diary, pp. 413-4 (entry for 8 Oct. 1947).
121 Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy, p. 360.
122 Documents on Canadian External Relations, 13,  1947, pp. 1192.
123 Toye, Labour Party, Chapter 7.
124 For a review of policy-conditioned lending by the World Bank to developing countries, see Paul 
Mosley, Jane Harrigan  and John Toye, Aid and Power: The World Bank and Policy-Conditioned 
Lending, 2 volumes, Routledge, 1985, 2nd edn.
125 David Dollar and Jakob Svensson, ‘What Explains the Success or Failure of Structural 
Adjustment Programmes?’, Economic Journal, 110 (2000), pp. 894-917. See also Burnham, ‘Re-
evaluating the Washington Loan Agreement’, p. 258.
126 G. John Ikenberry, ‘Creating Yesterday’s New World Order: Keynesian “New Thinking” and the 
Anglo-American Postwar Settlement’, in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds.), Ideas and 
Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca and London, 1993), pp. 57-86, at 
p. 61.
127 Burnham, ‘Re-evaluating the Washington Loan Agreement’, pp. 258-9.
